Daniel K. Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. and Safeway Stores, Inc. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Daniel K. Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. and
Safeway Stores, Inc. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Young, Thatcher & Glasmann; Counsel for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., No. 9161 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3532
Case No. 9161 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F I L E [' 
r~AR 1 6 1960 DANIEL K. :MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and--Apv:elt-an·t·····--·- ----····--·-·--·----···-- r-
Cler;:, ~upreme Court, Utz.h 
COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF 
OGDEN, a corporation, and SAFEWAY 
STORES, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Coca Cola Bottling Company of Ogden 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Respondent's Brief 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASl\fANN 
Counsel for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ------------------------------------ 1 
STATE~fgNT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------- 6 
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT BELOW IS PRE-
SUMED CORRECT, AND EVERY REASON-
ABLE INTE:NDMENT IS INDULGED IN 
FAVOR OF IT; THE BURDEN OF AFFIRM-
ATIVELY SHOWING ERROR IS ON AP-
PELLANT; AND THE JUDGMENT WILL 
BE AFFIRMED IF IT IS SUSTAINABLE 
ON ANY LEGAL GROUND OR THEORY AP-
pARENT ON THE RECORD ------------------------------------ 6 
POINT II. THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED UNDErR RULE 41 (b), U.R.C.P., 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S F AlLURE TO PROSE-
CUTE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
POINT III. ON THE RECORD THIS DEFEND-
ANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF FOR 
BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY __________________ 6 
POINT IV. THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITOR IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND 
THERE IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLI-
GENCE APPLICABLE TO THIS DE~FEND-
ANT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 
POINT V. THIS DEFENDANT IS NOT LIA-
BLE TO PLAINTIFF FOR VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTES RELATING TO ADULT-
ERATED FOODS; THERE IS NO PROOF 
TENDERED OR AVAILABLE THAT THE 
PRODUCT WAS ADULTERATED WHILE 
IN THE HANDS OF THE DEFENDANT ____________ 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT BELOW IS PRE-
SUMED CORRECT, AND EVERY REASON-
ABLE INTENDMENT IS INDULGED IN 
FAVOR OF IT; THE BURDEN OF AFFIR-
1IATIVE,LY SHOWING ERROR IS OK .A_P-
PELLANT; AND THE JUDGMENT \VILL 
BE AFFIRMED IF IT IS SUSTAINABLE 
ON ANY LEGAL GROUND OR THEORY AP-
pARENT ON THE RECORD ------------------------------------ i 
POINT II. THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED UNDER RULE 4l{b), L.R.C.P.~ 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PROSE-
CUTE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 8 
POINT III. ON THE RECORD THIS DE-
FENDANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PL ... liN-
TIFF FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED \VAR-
ANTY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------10 
A. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE A CLAIJ\f .AGAIXST THIS DE-
FENDANT FOR BREACH OF \VAR-
RANTY: NO NOTICE OF BREACH IS 
ALLEGED ----------------------------------------------------------------·JO 
B. AS A I\1ATTER OF LA \V. THIS DE-
FENDANT DID NOT \VARRANT TO 
PLANTIFF THE PRODUCT INYOLVED, 
AS THERE IS NO PRIVITY OF CON-
TRAC':r BETWEEN THE~l _________________________________ .12 
C. THE \YARRANTY. IF .AXY. ~PEAKS ~\.S 
OF THE DATE THE PRODUCT LEFT 
r_rHIS DEFENDANT'S POSSESSION, 
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SUB-
MITTED OR TENDERED TO PROVE 
THE BREACH OF \YARRANTY AL-
LEGED ·····-···--···················-········--·····-·········--- ----····-·· 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV. THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND 
THERE. IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLI-
GENCE APPLICABLE TO THIS DEFEND-
ANT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
POINT V. THIS DE.FENDANT IS NOT LIA-
BLE TO PLAINTIFF FOR VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTES RELATING TO ADULT-
ERATED FOODS; THERE IS NO PROOF 
TENDERED OR AVAILABLE THAT THE 
PRODUCT WAS ADULTERATED WHILE 
IN THE HANDS OF THIS DEFENDANT ____________ 38 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------39 
AUTHORTIES CITED 
COURT DECISIONS 
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Company 
(Ida. 1922), 35 Ida. 231, 205 Pac. 1118 ________________________ 18 
Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 
211 Pac. 991 ------------------------------------------------------------------------12 
Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Byrne 
(Ky. 1953) 258 S.W. 2d 475 --------------------------------------------36 
Berger v. Brannon ( 1949) 172 Fed. 2d 241 ____________________ 37 
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Company 
(Pa. 1943), 28 Atl. 913 ----------------------------------------------------19 
Bourcheix v. Willowbrook Dairy (N.Y. 1935) 268 
N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 --------------------------------------------------------19 
Boyd v. Buick Auto Company (Iowa), 165 N.W. 
908 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977 ________ 8 
Burrows v. Nash (Ore. 1953) 259 Pac. 2d 106 
Syllabus 8 -----------------------------------------------------------------:. _______ 26 
Burton v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Insti-
tution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514 -------------------------------- 8 
"Case of the Thorns," Y.B. 6 d. IV 7, pl. 18 (1466) _______ .40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling Con1-
pany 332 P. 2d 258 ------------------------------------------------------------20 
Chysky v. Great Bros. Co., (N.Y.) 139 N.E. 576, ____ 18, 20 
Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Cathey, 317 P. 2d 
1047 -----------····----·······----------·-·-----------··-·-·------------------------------20 
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms (Wis. 1952) 53 
N.W. 2d 788 --------······--------------------------------------------------------19 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680 ____________ 8 
Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (Tenn. 
1915)' 179 s.w. 155 -------------------------·-·---------------------------.18 
Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Cathey 
(Ariz. 1957) 317 Pac. 2d 1094, Syllabus 8. ______ : _________ 23 
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W. 2d 828 ___________ 20 
El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Cor-
poration (Cal. Dist. Court of ~lppeals 1949) 
203 P. 2d 13, Syllabus No. 11 ________________________________________ 23 
Flaccomio v. Eysink, (Maryland 1916) 129 :Jld. 
367, 100 Atl. 510. _____________________________________________________________ _17 
Fuller-Toponce Truck Con1pany -v. Public Service 
Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P. 2d 722, 7:25. _______________ _14 
Greenberg v. Lorenz (N.Y. Appellate Division 
1959) 183 N.Y. Supp. 2d 46 ___________________________________________ .19 
Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pac. 148 _____________ JO 
Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy (D.C. Court of Ap-
peals, 1939), 107 Fed. 2d 203 _______________________________________ .19 
Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling \Yorks (T·enn. 1936) 
98 S.W. 2d 113, follo,ving ___________________________________________ _18 
Hopkins v. Antorg Trading Corporation 38 X.Y.S. 
2d 788 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------38 
Huntsn1an v. Huntsnmn, 56 Utah 609, 192 Pac. 368 ________ 8 
Hutehi~on Y. Sn1art, 51 Utah 17~. 169 Pac. 166. ------------ 8 
Jaekson Land and Livestoek Company Y. Statt• 
rPax Commi8::;ion, 1~~i Utah -1-11, ~59 P. ~d 1084 _______ .14 
Jensen v. Logan City (1936). 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 
2d 708 ·············--------··--·------------------------------------27, 33, 35, 39 
,Johnson v. Stoddard ( 1\lass. 1D41). 37 N.E. 2d 505 ........ 38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Utah 
(1950) 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, A.L.R. 2d 
108 ---------------·············------------·-------------------------·---24, 30, 31, 39 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Railroad Com-
pany ( 1955), 3 Utah 2d 24 7, 282 P. 335. -------------------- 8 
Lukish v. Utah Construction Company, 48 Utah 
452, 160 Pac. 270 --------------------------------------------------------------14 
Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company (1955) 
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 Pac. 2d 1044 ----------------------------------36 
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769 ________ ll 
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Company (R. I. 
1929), 144 Atl. 884, 63 A.L.R. 334 ________________________________ 18 
National City Bank v. National Bank (Ill,) 132 
N.E. 832, 22 A.L.R. 1153 ----·-------------------------------------------14 
Nelson v. Armour Packing Company, (Ark. 1905), 
90 s.w. 288 ----------------------------------------------------------------------19 
Nehi Bottling Company v. Thomas, (Ky. 1930). 
33 s.w. 2d 701, ----------··---------------·----------··----------------------18 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
97 P. 2d 937, 240. ------------------------------------------------------------14 
Olmstead v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Company 
27 Utah 515, 76 Pac. 575 ________________________________________________ 37 
Parish v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com-
pany 177 N.Y. Supp. 2d 7 ------------------------------------------------19 
Palfreyman v. Bates and Rogers Construction 
Company, 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132. ____________________ 7 
Paul v. McBride (Mich.) 263 N.W. 877 __________________________ 19 
Pelletier v. Dupont (Me. 1925), 128 Atl. 186, 39 
A.L.R. 972 --------------------------------------------------------------------------18 
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143 ________ 25 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 Pac. 705 ________ 14 
Redman v. Borden's Farm Products Company 
(N.Y. 1927), 177 N.E. 838 ----------~---------------------------------18 
Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Association, 
(Mass. 1912) 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95. ____________________ 17 
Sharpe v. Danville Coca Cola Bottling Company 
(Ill. Appeals) 132 N.E. 2d 442 ____________________________________ 36 
Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (N.H. 1942) 
25 Atl. 2d 125 --------------------------------------------------------------------19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stave v. Giant Food Arcade (N.J. Law 1940), 16 
Atl. 2d 460 --------------------------------------------------------------------------19 
Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 959 ____________ 14 
Tedder v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (S.C.) 
77 S.E. 2d 293 --------------------------------------------------------------------38 
Utah National Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111 
Pac. 907 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------25 
Welhausen v. Charles Parker Company (Conn. 
1910) 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 ------------------------------------17 
Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Company (S.D. 1940) 
293 N.W. 859 --------------------------------------------------------------------19 
Williams v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 284 
s.w. 2d 53 --------------------------------------------------------------------------21 
Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling C01npany 
(Ill. Appeals) 98 N.E. 2d 164 ----------------------------------------23 
Williams v. S. H. Kress Company, 291 P. 2d 662 __________ 14 
Wisdom v. Texas Company ( 1939), 27 F. Supp. 922 ______ 9 
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company, 139 Atla. 
2d 84 ------------------------------------------------------------------------13, 18, 32 
Wood v. General Electric Company (Ohio Su-
preme Court 1953) 112 N.E. 2d 8 --------------------------------19 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 4-20-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________________ 2-± 
Section 4-20-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________ 2, 24 
Section 60-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________ 14, 15 
Section 60-3-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ______________ 2, 10 
Section 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ______________ 10, 12 
Rule 8( e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________________ 2 
Rule 12(h) Rules of Civil Procedure ______________________________ 11 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________________ 11, 37 
Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ______________ 6, 8 
Rule 75(p) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________ 1 
TEX.T AND ANNOTATIONS 
20 Am. J ur., "Evidence," Section 221, Page 217 
and Section 226, Page 221. --------------------------------------------25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 C.J.S., "Appeal and Error," Section 1464, Page 
72 --------------··········--·--------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
31 C.J.S., "E,vidence," Section 130, Page 748 Sec-
tion 134, Page 769 ; and Section 150 Page 840 ...... 24, 25 
31 C.J.S., "Evidence," Section 140, Page 789 and 
cases cited --------------------------····---------------------------------------·--··26 
65 C.J.S., "Negligence," Section 220(3), Page 995, 
Note 13. ----------------------------·--------------------------------·-----------------39 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 339, Notes 37 and 39 
Pages 1226 and 1227 -------------------·-------------------------···------11 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 361a, Page 1270, Note 11 ...... 11 
77 C.J.S., "Sales,' 305 b, pages 1123, especially 
page 1128, Notes 3 to 6. ------------------------------------------··--·---17 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 321, Page 1172, Notes 
33 to 35. ·····-··-------------·-·····----······-----······-·---·---·---·--·----··-···--23 
2 Harper & James, Tlte Law of Torts, Section 12.1 
and following ----------·--········------------------·-···------------------------40 
I Jones on E~vidence- Civil Cases, 4th Edition 
Section 12 and Section 101 -·-·····-----·--·---------------------------25 
I Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d Edition-
Revised) Section 361, Page 620. ----------------------------·-·-26 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act), 1931 
Edition, Page 297, Note III b, and Page 296, 
Note III e. -----·----------------------------------·-------------·-------------------11 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
15, Note II c, Page 109· and Pocket Supplement ........ 16 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
15, Note I, Page 106 and Pocket Supplement ____________ 16 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
12, Note I, Page 86 and Pocket Supplement ----·----·····-"17 
1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 438, 
Page 517 ---·------------------------------·-------------------------------------------30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL K. MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF 
OGDEN, a corporation, and SAFEWAY 
STORES, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Inasmuch as the defendant, Coca Cola Bottling 
Company of Ogden, controverts some important par-
ticulars of appellant's statement of facts, it becOines 
necessary that this defendant and respondent make its 
own statement of facts as required by Rule 75(p)(2). 
In defendant's staternent, references to the Deposition 
of the plaintiff, which is a part of the record, will be 
made by a "D." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Pleadings. Plaintiff's complaint (R 1-3) seeks 
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sus-
tained as a result of a paper clip coming out of a bottle 
of Coca Cola and lodging in his throat. It is alleged that 
plaintiff purchased the Coca Cola frorn defendant, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Safeway Stores, which had in turn previously purchased 
the same from the defendant Bottling Company. Under 
Rule 8(e), U.R.C.P., plaintiff in one count alleged, or 
attempted to allege three statements of his claim: one 
for sale of an adulterated product in violation of 8ec-
tion 4-20-5, U.C.A., 1953 (Paragraph VI), one for breach 
of an implied warranty of fitness for use and merchant-
ability (Paragraph VII), and one for negligence, both 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (Paragraph VIII) 
and generally (Paragraph IX). 
It is to be observed that nowhere in the attempted 
statement of a claim for breach of implied warranty 
(Paragraph VII), and nowhere else in the Complaint, 
is there any allegation of the giving of notice to de-
fendants, or either of them, of th'e claimed breach of 
warranty as required by Section 60-3-9, U.C.A., 1953. 
Plaintiff's Deposition. The deposition of the plain-
tiff was taken under the rules relating to discovery. 
The deposition developed the following facts. 
The plaintiff lives in a private dwelling house in 
Ogden, Utah. Two or three days prior to his birthday 
on February 2, 1959, plaintiff purchased two cartons 
of Coca Cola, small size, from a Safeway Self-service 
Store on Twenty-fourth Str'eet in Ogden. (D 12-14, 46) 
He picked up the two cartons from a stack against the 
East wall close to the South corner of the store. (D 13-
14) He took the two cartons of Coca Cola to his home 
and placed them on the floor in the fruit-romn. (D 15-
16) The fruit-room is a separate room at the rear, and 
opening out of the garage for his private automobile, 
which garage is built as an integral part of the dwelling 
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house. There is a door from the kitchen into the gar-
age and fron1 the garage into the fruit-room. The door 
between the garage and the fruit-room has no lock there-
on; only a latch. (D 10-12, 16, Exhibit 1 attached to 
the Deposition). 
Plaintiff drinks cokes quite regularly and since the 
purchase in question has purchased Coca Cola from other 
sources. (D 14-15). 
The garage has an overhead door that swings up. 
On some occasions the garage door is left open. (D 12). 
Plaintiff's married daughter lives next door and she 
and her husband visit back and forth a good deal. (D 27). 
There are children and teenagers living in the immediate 
neighborhood. (D 28). 
On February 27th, two or three days after the pur-
chase, the plaintiff had a birthday party. Most of the 
Coca Cola purchased at Safeway Stores was consumed 
at the party. The empty bottles were placed back in 
the garage in the carton. At the party the Coca Cola 
was taken out of the fruit-room and placed on the 
drainboard. (D 40, D 44). The party lasted three or 
four hours and the family guests were free to go out 
and pick up Coca Cola and open them at will. ( D45 ). 
Plaintiff's wife also shops for Coca Cola, but gets 
it from another store. (D 41). However, the plaintiff 
does not personally remember buying small size bottles 
on any other occasion. (D 41). 
The bottle in question, which had been removed 
frmn the carton at the time of the birthday party, was 
placed back on the floor of the fruit-room behind the 
garage and remained there, so far as the plaintiff knows, 
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until the time of the incident complainled of on March 
31 following, so that the bottle, if indeed it was one 
purchased from Safeway Stores instead of one pur-
chased from another source, was there from two or 
three days prior to February 27th until March 31st, 
except possibly for the duration of the birthday party, 
a period of five weeks. On the evening of March 31st 
the incident of which plaintiff complains occurred at 
about 8:30 P.M. (D 8). The paper clip caused some 
temporary discomfort, but nothing more. 
The incident was never reported to Safeway Stores. 
(D 15). Two or three days later, however, plaintiff did 
go to see Mr. Day, Manager of the Bottling Company, 
and took the bottle and one of the two paper clips in-
volved "to show him what happened." (D 25-26). Nothing 
further was done until the action was filed. 
The plaintiff has no information bearing on his 
claim one way or another and knows of no other fact 
that is relevant or pertains to his claim which might 
have a bearing thereon. (D 35-36) Although he was in-
terrogated by his own attorney (D 46) at the deposition, 
no additional facts were disclosed. 
Obviously he has no direct evidence of any negli-
gence by this defendant and no direct evidence that the 
paper clip in question was in the bottle of Coca Cola 
at the time it left the possession of this defendant, even 
assuming that it was bottled by defendant Bottling Com-
pany, as seen1s probable, it must be conceded, in view 
of the fact that the cap which plaintiff ren1oved (Ex-
hibit 4) bears this defendant's name as bottler. 
Proceedings. After this defendant answered by 
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general denial (R 7) the matter was set for pre-trial 
conference on October 21, 1959, before the Honorable 
Ray Van Cott, Jr., District Judge, and notice was given 
counsel for all parties. At the time and place set for 
the pre-trial counsel for both defendants appeated. 
After waiting some thirty minutes, the court caused a 
telephone call to be made to counsel for plaintiff and 
through that call the court and counsel for def'endants 
were advised that no appearance would be made at the 
pre-trial conference for the plaintiff but that plaintiff 
would stand on his complaint. 
The Court thereupon proce'eded with the pre-trial 
conference and counsel for this defendant advised the 
Court that it had available and would present at the 
trial evidence from which it would appear that the de-
fendant used great care to prevent foreign bodies, in-
cluding paper clips, from being present in Coca Cola 
bottled by it and that under the deposition there was 
ample opportunity for the introduction of the paper 
clip after the bottle left the possession and conrol of 
this defendant. The issues were discusS'ed and it was 
pointed out to the Court that there was not tendered or 
available any facts sufficient to take the case to the jury 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in view of the laws 
of the State of Utah established by the decisions of this 
Court, that there was no direct evidence of any negli-
gence on this defendant's part with respect to its hand-
ling of the bottle and product in question and no evidence 
sufficient to take the case to the jury that the bottle 
was contaminated at the time it left this defendant's 
hands, and that there was no bona fide issue presented, 
either on the theory of violation of the statute relating 
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to adulteration or of breach of warranty. The Motions 
for Summary Judgment for this defendant and for de-
fendant Safeway Stores were made and granted. 
The plaintiff then made this appeal. No motion 
to set aside th'e judgment and to set the matter again 
for pre-trial conference were ever made or submitted, 
and no affidavit was ever presented either to show any 
excusabl'e neglect in failing to appear at the pre-trial 
conference or that any evidence in addition to that con-
tained in the deposition was available or that plaintiff 
had available any evidence to controvert that tendered 
at the pre-trial conference by the defendants. 
On pages 3 and 5 of his brief, the plaintiff states 
that if given an opportunity at the trial he would testify 
as to certain additional facts which he claims would 
aid his case. However, there is nothing in the record 
to support this statement made in the brief. All of 
these matters are dehors the record and are not entitled 
to be considered. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The judgment below is presumed corr'ect, and 
every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor of it; 
the burden of affirmatively showing error is on appel-
lant; and the judgment will be affirmed if it is sustain-
able on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record. 
2. The action was properly dismissed under Rule 
41 (b), U.R.C.P., for plaintiff's failure to prosecute. 
3. On the record this defendant is not liable to 
plaintiff for breach of implied warranty. 
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4. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applic-
able, and there is no inference of negligence applicable 
to this defendant. 
5. '~Phis defendant is not liable to plaintiff for vio-
lation of the statutes relating to adulterated foods; there 
is no proof tendered or available that the product was 
adulterated while in the hands of this defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The judgment below is presumed correct, 
and every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor 
of it; the burden of affirmatively showing error is on 
appellant; and the judgment will be affirmed if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record. 
This point is, of course, merely preliminary. The 
law stated is a fundamental part of the law relating to 
appeals. These rules are well establish'ed in the Law 
of Utah, as elsewhere. 
There is a presumption that the judgment of the 
trial court was correct, and every reasonable intend-
ment must be indulged in favor of it; the burden of af-
firmatively showing error is on the party complaining 
thereof. 
Palfreyman v. Bates and Rogers Construction 
Company, 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132. 
In the absence of anything in the record to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court must presume that the 
trial court properly directed judgment for defendant. 
The only question, in absence of a Bill of Exceptions, 
is whether pleadings will support the judgment, and 
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where the answer pleaded a general denial and affirm-
ative defens'e pleadings did support judgment. 
Hutchison v. Smart, 51 Utah 172, 169 Pac. 166. 
Every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged 
in favor of the validity and correctness of the judgment 
under review, and it will not be disturbed unl'ess the 
appellant meets his burden of affirmatively showing 
error. 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company 
(1955), 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335. 
S'ee also: 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680. 
Burton v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Insti-
tution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514. 
Morever, even if it should appear that the judg-
ment of the trial court could not be supported on the 
theory or grounds assigned by the trial court, the judg-
ment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any 
l'egal ground or theory apparent on the record. 
5 C.J.S., "Appeal and Error," Section 1464, Page 
72. 
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977. 
Huntsman v. Huntsman, 56 Utah 609, 192 Pac. 
368. 
As will be hereinafter pointed out, the judgment of 
the trial court can be supported on several theories and 
grounds in addition to those assign'ed by the Court. 
Point 2. The action was properly dismissed under 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., for plaintiff's failure to prosecute. 
Rule 41 (b) provides, 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
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... the defendant may rnove for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him ... " 
It was held, in a Federal case decided before 
Utah's adoption of the Rules, that where the plaintiff 
failed to appear at a pre-trial hearing ordered by the 
Court a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper. 
Wisdom v. Texas Company (1939), 27 F. Supp. 
922. 
It is submitted that it is not fair either to defend-
ants or to the trial court for a plaintiff to fail to appear 
at a pretrial conference ordered by the Court for the 
purpose of sirnplifying the issues and eliminating issues 
which are not bona fide and for considering such other 
matters as n1ay aid in the disposition of the action, and 
then to have preserved for trial issues which would 
have clearly been eliminated had he appeared and made 
a full and frank disclosure as to the limitations of evi-
dence available. N·either is it fair or proper or lawful 
after such failure to appear that plaintiff be allowed, 
dehors the record, the benefit of evidence stated in his 
brief to be availabl'e but which was not disclosed at the 
pre-trial nor contained in any affidavit in support of 
any motion to be relieved of his default in failing to 
appear at the pre-trial. To let the plaintiff profit from 
his own default in this regard would violate established 
principles relating to an appeal upon the record made, 
and would certainly violate the entire spirit and purpose 
of the Rules of Procedure. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgrnent below 
must be affirmed on this ground, although not specific-
ally relied on by the trial court in the rendering· of its 
decision. 
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Point 3. On the record this defendant is not liable 
to plaintiff for breach of implied warranty. 
A. Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim 
against this defendant for breach of warranty: No notice 
of breach is alleged. 
By Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, the Legislature of 
Utah, as the constitutionally established policy-making 
agency of the State, has declared: 
The statutes establish the laws of this State 
respecting the subjects to which th·ey relate ... 
This Court has held that in view of this statutory 
provision the statutes on any particular subject are 
mandatory and exclude the common law or rules under 
the doctrine of Stare Decisis which are not in conform-
ity with the statutory law of this state. 
Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pac. 148. 
In other words, when the Legislature of Utah by 
statute declares the law and policy of the state with 
respect to a particular subject or matter it preempts 
the field and the courts are no longer free to follow any 
other rule or law no matter how appealing it may be 
to the judges thereof. The Legislature of Utah has de-
clared the law on this subject: 
"But if, after aceeptance of the goods, the 
buyer fails to give notice to the Seller of the 
breach of any promise or warranty within a 
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought 
· to know, of such breach, the seller shall not b'e 
liable therefore." Section 60-3-9, U.C.A., 1953. 
This Court has held that under the statute quoted 
10 
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ffi· 
that tiiuely notice is a vital condition precedent to any 
action for breach of warranty and that if the complaint 
failed to allege that notice of breach of warranty had 
been given prior to the c01nrnencement of the action, 
the eomplaint was fatally defective and did not state 
a cause of action or claim under breach of warranty. 
Niawhinne)r v. Jens·en, 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769. 
Such is the general rule under the sales act. 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 339, Notes 37 and 39, 
Pages 1226 and 1227. 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," Section 361a, Page 1270, Note 
11. 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act), 1931 
Edition, Page 297, Note IIIb, and Page 296, Note 
IIIe. Se-e also the Pocket Supplement of said 
Notes. 
In this case plaintiff did not allege any notice of 
breach. He did not appear at the pre-trial or at any 
tiine and request leave to arnend to allege notice of 
breach. I-Iis cornplaint is fatally defective as a claim 
for breach of warranty, and there is nothing to be proved 
thereunder which would be sufficient to go to the jury. 
Accordingly, the judgrnent below rnust be affirm·ed un-
less it can be overthrown under some other theory 
that is not the case, as will be hereinafter considered. 
'rhe failure of the complaint to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted can, of course, be considered 
at any tirne to and including the trial on the rnerits. 
Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. In simplifying the issues under 
Rule 16, it is, of course, proper to ·eliminate an issue 
inadequately pleaded, where, as here, the plaintiff stands 
11 
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on his complaint. 
B. As a matter of law, this defendant did not war-
rant to plaintiff the product involved, as there is no 
privity of contract between them. 
A brief consideration of some preliminary matters 
should be helpful to the Court. First, we advert once 
more to Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, declaring that the 
statutes of Utah establish the laws of this state respect-
ing the subjects to which they relate, as heretofore dis-
cussed. This principle of statutory law renders irrel-
evant the arguments on page 6 of plaintiff's brief as re-
gards the historical development of the obligation of 
warranty and its relationship to an action on the case 
for deceit. In this connection it must be born in mind 
that if plaintiff is to gain any comfort from any im-
agined relationship of this case to an action for deceit, 
he must plead and prove this defendant's guilty know-
ledge of contamination, and this is nowhere claimed and 
cannot be claimed. See 
Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 
223, 211 Pac. 991. 
This statute also disposes of the arguments made 
on pages 12 to 19, inclusive, of plaintiff's brief in which 
plaintiff urges this court to turn its back on the Utah 
statutes and declare either that a manufacturer's war-
ranty "runs with the commodity," or, that a warranty 
exists between the manufacturer and a remote buyer, 
without regard to how many people have handled the 
product or what time has lapsed between the manu-
facturer's surrender of control and possession and the 
time the purchaser discovers a breach of warranty, be-
12 
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cause "Public policy demands it." The Legislature of 
Utah has declared public policy on this subject. That 
is the particular prerogative of the Legislature under 
our system of division of powers, and we apprehend 
that this Court will not undertake to ursurp the Legis-
lative prerogative no matter how earnestly solicted by 
the plaintiff nor how sympathetically they may regard 
the plaintiff and his alleged injuries. 
A recent ( 1958) Rhode Island case is pertinent. In 
an earlier decision th'e Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
had held that privity of contract in the traditional forn1 
is essential to the finding of any warranty under the 
sales act. In 
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company, 139 Atla. 2d 
84, 
the plaintiff there urged upon the Court the same con-
siderations as are urged by plaintiff here. The Court 
said: 
"If, as plaintiffs' seemed to suggest in oral 
argument, it is desired that we reconsider and 
overrule that case we can only say that we decline 
to do so and repeat that if a mor'e enlightened 
policy demands a change in the law, the Legis-
lature and not this Court is the one to make it." 
(Page 85) 
Second, the Uniform Sales Act of Utah was copied 
after the proposed uniform act and after the act was 
adopted by several other states whose courts of last 
resort had previously construed the provisions here in-
volved. Under these circumstances, this court, under 
familiar rules well established in Utah, is bound to fol-
low the courts of the other states which construed the 
13 
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act prior to the time Utah's Legislature adopted it. 
Generally, where statutes of other states are adopted, it 
is assumed that the construction placed thereon by the 
courts of that state prior to adoption is also adopted, 
and a case decided by such a court is decisive of a ques-
tion of construction of the statute. 
Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 959. 
National City Bank v. National Bank, (Ill.) 132 
N.E. 832, 22 A.L.R. 1153. 
In re Ral'eigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 Pac. 705. 
Jackson Land and Livestock Company v. State 
Tax Commission, 123 Utah 411, 259 P. 2d 1084. 
Lukish v. Utah Construction Company, 48 Utah 
452, 160 Pac. 270. 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
97 P. 2d 937, 940. 
Fuller-Toponce Truck Company v. Public Service 
Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P. 2d 722, 725. 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, let 
us turn to the Utah statute on which plaintiff relies, 
Section 60-1-15, U.C.A., 1953 (Section 15 of th'e Uniform 
Act). 
If this section is at all applicable, it is subdivision 4 
(not quoted by plaintiff) which applies. It is as follows: 
" ( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or the 
sale of a specified article under its patent or other 
tradename, there is no implied warranty as to 
its fitness for any particular purpose." 
See 
Williams v. S. H. Kress Company, 291 P. 2d 662. 
where the Washington Court in 1955 considred an es-
14 
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sentially identical situation. There the plaintiff, in a 
sefl-service store, picked up a bottle of "Aseptisol" which 
was labeled as being useful as a mouthwash, and claimed 
that it was unfit for use as a mouthwash and injurious 
when so used. The Court held that this purchase fell 
under paragraph 4 of Section 15 of the Act and that 
there was no warranty. 
However, the portion of the statute on which plain-
tiff relies (Page 7 of his brief, Section 60-1-15, U.C.A.,) 
provides that 
"Subject to the provisions of this title and 
of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied 
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness 
for any particular purpose of goods supplied 
under a contract to sell or a sale except as fol-
lows : (Emphasis added.) 
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or hy implica-
tion makes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required, and 
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgm·ent (whether he is the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an in1plied war-
ranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for 
such purpose." (Emphasis added.) 
Note first, that this sales act expressly negatives any 
implied warranty except as specifically provided by 
statute. Note in the second place, that under paragraph 
1 the implied warranty provided for arises only from 
communication between the immediate buyer and seller 
-those involved in the transaction in question-and not 
a remote preceding transaction. 
The second exception provided 1n paragraph 2 of 
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that section is that "where goods are bought by descrip-
tion there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
of merchantable quality." Here we have no buying by de-
scription. Here the plaintiff-buyer himself picked up 
from a self -service store the 'exact articles he desired to 
purchase; he never provided the seller with a descrip-
tion of goods and asked the seller to fill his order accord-
ing to the description. No warranty can be predicated 
here on paragraph (2). 
Turning now to the question of whether or not 
privity is required in order for a warranty to arise, let 
us consider very briefly the nature of an implied war-
ranty under the Sales Act. While it is true that an im-
plied warranty involves an obligation imposed by law, 
yet the nature of the obligation is in contract and not 
in tort. From the fact of the consummation of a con-
tract of sale, the law implies a further collateral con-
tract of warranty, unl'ess the parties otherwise agree. 
See 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
15, Note II c, Page 109 and Pocket Supplement. 
Hence, if there is no contract between the parties the 
law will imply no warranty between the parties. Whether 
the warranty is regarded as contractual or merely a 
legal obligation imposed by statute,under Utah Law 
and under the statutes it arises only out of the fact of 
a contract, and if there is no contract and no privity 
then there is no implication of warranty. This is the 
general law. See 
1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
15, Note I, Page 106 and Pocket Supplen1ent; 
16 
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1 Uniform Laws Annotated (Sales Act) Section 
12, Note I, Page 86 and Pocket Supplement; 
77 C.J.S., "Sales," 305 b, pages 1123, especially 
page 1128, Notes 3 to 6. 
Let us now consider what judicial precedent is avail-
able in and binding on this court with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Sales Act as regards the requirement 
of privity of contract in order to make an implied war-
ranty effective. Utah adopted the Uniform Sales Act 
in 1917. So far as we can ascertain only three courts 
of last resort had had occasion to consider the problem 
in jurisdictions where the Sales Act was in force. They 
are Connecticut, Massachusetts and Maryland. The 
courts of all three of these states held that privity of 
contract is a necessary element in any action for breach 
of implied warranty. See 
W elhausen v. Charles Parker Company (Conn. 
1910) 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271. 
Flaccomio v. Eysink, (Maryland 1916) 129 .Md. 
367, 100 Atl. 510. 
Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Association, 
(Mass. 1912) 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95. 
The Connecticut case concerned a gun, the Maryland 
case whiskey, and the Massachusetts case food. How-
ever, it must be pointed out that the Sales Act applies 
to all goods and merchandise and not just to food items. 
It is comprehensive and preempts the entire field. 
It must be conceded also that neither the Connecti-
cut nor the Massachus·etts courts referred to the Sales 
Act, but it must be presumed that the courts acted 
regularly and made their decision in the light of the 
17 
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Sales Act then in force. The Flaccomio case from 
Maryland is exactly in point. 
It is respectfully submitted that, inasmuch as these 
cases were decided under the Sales Act by courts of 
last resort of the states who had previously adopted 
the Sales Act and prior to the time Utah enacted the 
law, they are in point and state the law of Utah in this 
regard. 
However, as indicated, the majority rule of the 
cases decided under the Sales Act are in accord and hold 
that privity is a necessary prerequisite to any implied 
warranty. See, in addition to the Rhode Island case of 
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company, supra, the following 
cas'es: 
Chysky v. Great Bros. Co., (N.Y.) 139 N.E. 576, 
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Com-
pany, (Ida. 1922), 35 Ida. 231, 205 Pac. 11118, 
Pelletier v. Dupont (Me. 1925), 128 Atl. 186, 39 
A.L.R. 972, 
Redman v. Borden's Farm Products Company 
(N.Y. 1927), 177 N.E. 838, 
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Company 
(R. I. 1929), 144 Atl. 884, 63 A.L.R. 334, 
Nehi Bottling Con1pany v. Thomas, (Ky. 1930), 
33 s. w. 2d 701, 
Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling Works (Tenn. 
1936), 98 S.W. 2d 113, following 
Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (Tenn. 
1915), 179 S.W. 155 (specifically holding that the 
Sales Act doesn't change the rule requiring priv-
ity for implied warranty), 
18 
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Nelson v. Armour Packing Company, (Ark. 1905 ), 
90S.W. 288 (decided, however, prior to adoption 
of the Sales Act), 
Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy (D.C. Court of Ap-
peals, 1939), 107 Fed. 2d 203, 
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Company 
(Pa. 1943), 28 Atl. 913, 
Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Company (N. H. 
1942) 25 Atl. 2d 125, 
Stave v. Giant Food Arcade (N. J. Law 1940), 16 
Atl. 2d 460, 
Bourcheix v. Willowbrook Dairy (N.Y. 1935) 
268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617, 
Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Company ( S. D. 1940) 
293 N.W. 859, 
Paul v. McBride (Mich.) 263 N.W. 877, (as ap-
plied to a non-food item), 
Greenberg v. Lorenz (N.Y. Appellate Division 
1959) 183 N.Y. Supp. 2d 46, 
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms (Wis. 1952) 53 
N.W. 2d 788, and 
Wood v. General Electric Company (Ohio Sup-
reme Court 1953) 112 N.E. 2d 8. 
The plaintiff-appellant in his brief (p. 13) cites 
a Texas case in support of his plea that this Court dis-
pense with the requirement of privity of contract. How-
ever, T·exas has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act. 
Again, on page 14 of his brief, the plaintiff cites 
Parish v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Cmn-
pany, 177 N.Y. Supp. 2d 7, 
from the municipal court of New York (a trial court) 
19 . 
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to the effect that no privity is necessary. Surely this can 
have no weight in view of the fact that the New York 
Court of Appeals has reached a contrary conclusion. See 
Chysky v. Great Bros. Company, 235 N.Y. 468, 139 
N.E~. 576. 
The Court of Appeals there said: 
"The general rule is that a manufacturer or 
seller of food, or orther article of personal pro-
perty, is not liable to third persons, under an im-
plied warranty, who have no contractual relations 
with him. The reason for this rule is that privity 
of contract does not exist between the seller and 
such third persons, and unless there is privity of 
contract there can b'e no implied warranty." 
The Chysky case was one of a nail found in a cake 
-substantially identical with the case at Bar. So far 
as we can ascertain it still states the Law of New York 
as regards implied warranty. 
Again on page 15 of his brief, the plaintiff cites an 
Arizona cas·e 
Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Cathey, 317 P. 
2d 1047. 
It is hardy authority for plaintiff's position here, for, 
although Arizona has adopted the Uniform Sales Act, 
the Arizona Court fell into the error of deciding the 
case without any referenc·e to the statutory law of the 
state, and followed the Texas comnwn law decision of 
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W. 2d 828. 
Again page 17 of his brief, plaintiff relies on the 
Kansas case of 
Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling Com-
20 
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pany, 332 P. 2d 258 
as well as other Kansas cases cited. Unfortunately for 
plaintiff, Kansas also has not adopted the Uniform 
Sales Act. 
A word needs to be said about the case of Williams 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 284 S. W. 2d 53, cited 
on page 18 of plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff cites the case 
as if it were from the Supreme Court of Missouri. 
That is not the case. It was decided by the St. Louis 
Court of Appeals, an intermediate court. :Moreover, 
the conclusion reached by the Court upon the warranty 
issue is best summed up in the following statement from 
the case: 
"Reasonable opportunity to tamper or adult-
erate having been shown, it was encumbant upon 
the plaintiff to prove, directly or by circuinstan-
tial evidence, that in fact there was no such tam-
pering or adulteration." 
It must be conceded that California and Washington 
and some other states have in food cases dispensed with 
privity in an implied warranty case under the Sales 
Act, but it is submitted that the cases are poorly r·easoned 
from a legal point of view, no matter what the court 
may think of them as a matter of wise judicial legis-
lation. It is our firm belief that under our form of 
government judicial legislation is never wis'e. It can 
only lead to confusion and in the end to the discrediting 
of the judicial system. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts 
pleaded and admitted in the deposition, the plaintiff 
cannot claim as against this defendant the benefit of 
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an implied warranty because he made no contract with 
this defendant, and privity of contract and the existence 
of a sales contract between the parties is a necessary 
prerequisite to the evoking of an implied warranty, and 
here there is admittedly no such contract and no such 
privity between plaintiff and this defendant. 
C. The warranty, if any, speaks as of the date the 
product left this defendant's possession, and there is no 
evidence submitted or tendered to prove the breach of 
warranty alleged. 
It must be remembered that one bottle of Coca 
Cola is like another and that so far as the particular 
bottle of Coca Cola in question is concerned there is 
nothing to show when it left the possession and control 
of defendant's Bottling Company (assuming it was in 
their possession and control) except that it must have 
done so at some time prior to the evening when plaintiff 
picked the bottle up from a stack in the Safeway Self-
service Store on February 24 or 25, 1959·. In view of 
the well-known fact that large stores maintain store-
rooms where a stock of such items is maintained, and 
the fact that this was during the wintertime when the 
demand for beverages is naturally slower, it could have 
been many many months, perhaps even years prior to 
that date. At any rate, for at least four and a half 
weeks, and in all probability much longer, the bottle was 
out of the possession and control of defendant Bottling 
Company. 
In the absence of an express contract, a warranty 
relates only to the time of sale and does not cover future 
defects not in existence at the time of sale. 
22 
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77 C.J.S. "Sal'es," Section 321, Page 1172, Notes 
33 to 35. 
An implied warranty, if it exists with respect to a bev-
erage, is only that it is fit for human consumption "when 
the product leaves the control of the manufacturer or 
bottler." 
Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Com-
pany (Ill. Appeals) 98 N.E. 2d 164. 
El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Cor-
poration (Cal. Dist. Court of Appeals 1949) 203 
P. 2d 13, Syllabus No. 11. 
Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey (Ariz. 
1957) 317 Pac. 2d 1094, syllabus 8. (Cited 
by plaintiff on another point.) 
Thus, even where there is a warranty it is only 
that the product meets the terms of the warranty at the 
time of the sale ; there is no warranty implied that the 
produc is "tamper proof" after it leaves the man~tfac­
turer's possession. This concept is implicit even in all 
the cases which have permitted recovery under a war-
ranty, and so far as we know or have been able to as-
vertain there is no case which has allowed a recovery 
on the th'eory of warranty in the absence of adequate 
proof that the product was unfit when it left the hands 
of the defendant charged. 
Apparently, the plaintiff here desires this Court 
to indulge the plaintiff with a presumption that becaus'e 
he found a paper clip in the bottle when he drank frorn 
it on March 31, 1959, the paper clip was in the bottle 
when it left the hands of the def'endant Bottling Corn-
pany some undetermined time prior thereto, which would 
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be at least four and a half weeks and perhaps that many 
months. There is no such presumption or inference 
available to plaintiff under the law of Utah. The pre-
sumption in this regard is substantially the same as the 
one which the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to have 
applied in the case of 
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Utah 
(1950) 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A.L.R. 2d 
108. 
More will be said of the Jordan case later. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts 
and circumstances of this case and the charges made in 
the complaint upon which plaintiff relies, there is on 
the contrary a very strong presumption that the bottle 
was uncontaminated and unadulterated when it left the 
possession and control of defendant Bottling Company. 
This presumption arises from the following consider-
ations. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff charges this defend-
ant, the manufacturer of beverages for human consump-
tion, with the violation of Sections 4-20-3 and 4-20-5, 
U.C.A., 1953, a criminal offense. He seeks to recover on 
that ground as well as on the ground of breach of war-
ranty. If the warranty was breached, then, ipso facto 
this defendant is also guilty of the criminal offense. 
Under these circumstances, a very strong presump-
tion of innocence, in favor of legality and compliance with 
law, and of rightful action and performance of duty 
arises. This presumption applies in civil cases as well 
as in criminal cases. 
31 C.J.S., "Evidence," Section 130, Page 7 48; 
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Section 134, Page 769; and Section 150 Page 840. 
See also, 
20 Am. J ur., "E.vidence," Section 221, Page 217 
and Section 226, Page 221. 
In said Section 221 of American Juris prudence it is said 
"One of the strongest disputable presump-
tions known to the law is the presumption 'that 
a person is innocent of crime.' This presumption 
applies not only in criminal cases, but also in civil 
cases where the commission of the crime con1es 
collaterally in question." 
This presumption has found familiar application 
in Utah in the presumption against fraud, 
Utah National Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111 
Pac. 907, 
and the presumption that persons living together as man 
and wife ar'e legally married. 
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143. 
It is one of the most favored presumptions in the 
law. See 
I Jones on Evidence-Civil Cases, 4th Edition, 
Section 12 and Section 101. 
In the latter section the learned author says that 
"Generally speaking, no legal presurnption is 
so highly favored as that of innocence; ordinarily 
substantially all other presumptions yield to it 
in case of conflict." 
If it should appear that one of two persons rnust 
have violated a law or acted improperly the presump-
tion of innocence attaches to the party defendant rather 
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than to one who is a stranger and the innocence of a 
party is preferred as a presumption to that of a stranger 
to the action. 
I Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d Edition-
Revised) Section 361, Page 620. 
However, entirely independent of the benefit of the 
presumptions of innocence and legality, proof of the 
presence of the paper clips in the bottle on the evening 
of March 31st is not proof that they were in the bottle 
when it left defendant Bottling Company's possession 
five weeks or five months prior thereto, as the case may 
be. There is no presumption and no inference that a fact 
of this kind established as of March 31 also existed at 
a time more than five we'eks prior thereto. 
Many respectable authorities have declared that 
mere proof of the existence of a present condition or 
state of facts or proof of the existence of a condition or 
state of facts at a given time, does not raise any pre-
sumption that the same condition or facts existed at a 
prior date, since inference or presumptions of fact ordin-
arily do not run backward. 
31 C.J.S., "Evidence," Section 140, Page 789 and 
cases cited. 
See also 
Burrows v. Nash (Ore. 1953) 259 Pac. 2d 106, 
syllabus 8. 
However, it must be conceded that as applied to 
smne facts and conditions, this rule cannot be logically 
indulged, and a retroactive infer·ence of continued ex-
istence of a fact or condition can and probably 1nust be 
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indulged in under some circumstances. For instance, 
as Professor Wigmore comments, proof of the existence 
of a mountain at a certain locality at a tim'e specified 
certainly justifies the inference and presumption that 
the nwuntain has been there at that spot for some time 
previously. If, however, the mountain is of volcanic 
origin the natur'e of the thing dictates that the pre-
existence of even that mountain cannot be indulged over 
too long a time. I am sure that the members of this 
court all recall that during the last thirty years in 
:Mexico an entirely n'ew volcanic mountain of tremendous 
size started with a wisp of smoke in a corn field and 
grew within the course of four or five years. 
The crux of the matter is the likelihood of an in-
tervening change and th'e ease with which it can be 
made in the given period of time. 
Mr. Jus tics Wolfe, formerly of this Court, in the 
case of 
Jensen v. Logan City (1936), 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 
2d 708, 
has written what is probably a definitive discussion on 
the subject with his usual careful and brilliant analysis. 
In that case the plaintiff sought damages from Logan 
City upon the theory, among others, that the City's 
·employees had negligently placed fencing wire, which had 
been detached from one post but remained attached at 
the other end to another post, across a sidewalk and 
that plaintiff had stumbled over the wire at 11 :30 o'clock 
at night and fallen to his injury. Plaintiff testified and 
other witness·es testified that the wire was on the side-
walk at the time he stumbled. The trial court took frmn 
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the jury the question of negligence in placing the wire 
in a dangerous position over the paved sidewalk. It 
was argu'ed in behalf of the plaintiff that the fact that 
the wire was seen to protrude at a later hour was evi-
dence that it had been protruding at a previous time 
earlier in the day when the City's employees had un-
fastened the wire from the first post and had been work-
ing with the fence in that vicinity. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's action in re-
moving this issue from th·e jury. 
The City's employee testified that at the time earlier 
in the day when he worked with the fence, he folded 
th·e loosened portion back against the fastened portion 
of the fence, passed the ends of the wire around the 
post and then twisted the wire around itself with a pair 
of pliers thus fastening the loose portion of the f•ence 
back to the fixed portion. This Court held that under 
these circumstances the court acted properly in taking 
the issue from the jury. Mr. Justic·e Wolfe, speaking 
for the Court, said: 
"There is no evidence that the City initially 
permitted it to protrude. The evidence that peo-
pl·e later saw it so is not evidence from which 
such inference can be drawn because such evi-
dence is too remote. The intervention of third 
persons or of natural forces acting on what might 
have be·en initially a well fastened fence may 
have disposed the fence to a position partially 
across the paved portion of the sidewalk, and 
unless there was evidence that it was so se·en 
within a reasonable time after the actual fasten-
ing back of the doubled part, such evidence is not 
probative of the fact that it was originally so 
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left ... In ensembles that have an inherent degree 
of permanency, an inference may arise that they 
were in the same state a certain time before, 
but the greater the element of unstability inher-
ent in the state of configuration, the greater the 
probability of change and the n'earer in time to 
the initiating of the condition must be the obser-
vation." 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, considering the matter further, 
also says: 
""Whether an inference that a certain state 
was initially created may be drawn from evidence 
that it was seen in that state at a certain ti1ne 
after initiation depends on the circu1nstances sur-
rounding the establishment and existence of the 
object whose states of being are in controversy, 
together with the inh'erent ability or inability of 
the object to resist changes or status. The pro-
bativeness of such evidence is somewhat a matter 
for the trial court. If reasonable minds could 
reasonably differ as to whether or not such evi-
dence was too remote to have probative value, 
the ruling of the lower court would not be dis-
turbed whichever way that ruling went. In this 
case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the 
court did not err when it held that the evidence 
of the state of affairs sometime after Kent fast-
ened back th'e fence had no probative value on 
the issue as to how the fence had reposed at the 
time he fastened it ... " (Emphasis added). 
In this case, the learn'ed trial judge very properly 
and reasonably concluded that from the fact of con-
tamination on March 31 no presumption or inference 
can be drawn that it was so contaminated while in the 
hands of the defendant Bottling Company. Such was 
the conclusion of this Court with respect to the con-
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dition of a bottle of Coca Cola in the case of Jordan v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Company, supra, where the lapse 
of time and the opportunity for intervention of third 
parties and pranksters were substantially less than in 
the cas'e now before this court. It will be ren1en1bered 
that in the Jordan case, the plaintiff opened and started 
to consume the bottle of Coca Cola while he was still on 
the premises of the retailer from whom he had purchased 
the same through the operation of a locked vending 
machine. This case is indeed much stronger than th'e 
Jordan case on the facts. Under these circumstances, 
in the absence of any evidence tendered in the record 
to show that the bottle had not been tampered with 
since it left the possession of the defendant Bottling 
Company, the ruling of the trial court in the exercise 
of that court's discretion, should not be disturbed, as 
there is no proof tendered suffici'ent to go to the jury on 
th·e issue that the alleged warranty was breached at 
the time the Coca Cola left this defendant's possession 
and control. Prof'essor Wigmore also agrees that in 
these matters trial judges must be given wide latitude of 
discretion. 
1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 
438, Page 517. 
And, as noted in the Jordan case and in 1nany other 
cases, it is common knowledge that the cap fron1 a 
bottle of Coca Cola can, with only a little care, be re-
moved and replaced in such a way as virtually to defy 
detection. 
It must be recalled that if plaintiff is to prevail 
on breach of warranty, he n1ust have ·evidence to show 
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not only that the paper clips were in the bottle when 
he opened the same, but that they were in the bottle 
while the bottle was in the possession and control of 
defendant Bottling Company five weeks or more prior 
thereto. 
There is no presumption that a state of things found 
to exist has existed for any considerable time before 
being discovered; a presumption of continu'ed existence 
or pre-existence will not determine the instant in which 
the change took place. This, of course, is particularly 
true where the state of things are susceptibl'e to easy 
change. See 
Boyd v. Buick Auto Company (Iowa) ,165 N.W. 
908. 
For each of the several reasons given, it is respect-
fully submitted that def'endant Bottling Company is 
not liable to plaintiff for implied breach of warranty. 
Point 4. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not 
applicable, and there is no inference of negligence appli-
cable to this defendant. 
Implicit in th·e plaiintiff's brief, on the question of 
liability for negligence, is the admission by plaintiff 
that he cannot recover here on the theory of negligence 
unless he can prevail upon this Court to upset the estab-
lish:ed law of Utah and overrule the case of 
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Utah, 
(1950) 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A.L.R. 
2d 108. 
(Plaintiff's brief, page 20). This should not be done. 
Stability in the law is one of the prime requisites of an 
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orderly society. Consequently when the law on a sub-
ject has been solemnly declared after full hearing and 
what was undoubtedly a most exhaustive consideration 
and discussion of the principles and authorities involved 
within the court itself, the rule of stare decisis should 
be followed in the absen~e of some showing of mistake 
or oversight by the Court. The Court, no less than 
other public officers and members of society, must be 
bound by the law thus settled for this jurisdiction. This 
principle has always guided this Court. Moreover, once 
the law has b'een settled and declared, if changes are 
desired the proper agency is the legislature and not 
the courts ; the courts are bound to declare the law as 
they find it and not to infringe the prerogative of the 
legislature to create new law or to change old law. 
As the Rhode Island court so recently said 
"If a more enlightened policy demands a 
change in the law the legislature and not this 
court is the one to make it." 
Wolfe v. S. H. Wintman Company (1958), 139 
Atl. 2d 84. 
There is, of course, no direct evidence of negligence 
on the part of this defendant and plaintiff farther im-
plicitly admits that he cannot recover except under the 
doctrine of res ipsa ioquitur, which is not applicable 
under the Jordan case. Also, it is apparent that plain-
tiff concedes that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is 
not applicable unless there is proof sufficient to go to 
the jury that th'e Bottling Company has "exclusive con-
trol at the time the deleterious substance is introduced 
into said bottle." (Plaintiff's brief, page 20). 
It is submitted that the Jordan case not only estab-
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~[, 
i~l 
lishes the law of Utah, put that it is soundly reasoned 
and deserves to be followed and reaffirmed. 
The basis of this Court's decision in the Jordan case 
is that proof of contamination existing in a bottle of 
Coca Cola upon opening immediately after withdrawal 
from a vending machine serviced on a daily basis by 
defendant Bottling Company did not give rise to an 
inference that the bottle was contaminated while in 
defendant Bottling Company's possession and control, 
where the machine was replenished from stock available 
in a foreman's office and several people had keys to 
the machine. The Court very properly refused to 
indulge, under these circumstances, and in view of the 
fact (of which both the majority and the minority opin-
ion took notice) that the bottle is not "tamper proof" 
and can be in a few moments op'ened, contaminated and 
resealed in such a manner as practically to defy detect-
ion and without the contents loosing their effervescent 
quality. The Court very properly recognized that in 
this world mischief-makers and impractical practical 
jokers are quite prevalent and that where, as in every 
case of negligence, the ultimate burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot be indulged with the 
benefit of a presumption that an opportunity for tamper-
ing has not resulted in tampering. 
The Jordan case is in entire conformity with the 
very carefully reasoned decision of this Court 1n the 
case of 
J ens·en v. Logan City, supra 
and is supported thereby. 
In the case at Bar, the plaintiff (Plaintiff's brief, 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
page 21) seeks comfort from the unsupported statement 
made in his brief that, if given an opportunity, the 
plaintiff would testify that the bottle was hard to op'en 
and that when opened it popped and fizzed, i.e. that its 
effervescent qualities continued to his opening. In this 
connection it is interesting to note that 'even in the dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Latimer in the Jordan 
case it was recognized and even asserted that a Coca 
Cola cap can be removed and replaced without detection 
except by an expert and that a bottle must be left open 
for some considerable length of time before th·e liquid 
will lose its effervescent qualities. However this may 
be, there is nothing in the record, either by tender of 
evidence at the pre-trial or by affidavit in support of a 
motion to set aside the judgment below or in plaintiff's 
deposition to indicate that he would in fact so testify. 
This is outside the record and not properly argued. 
The rule of the Jordan case gains additional force 
where, as here, the defendant Bottling Company is 
charged with a criminal offense in preparing and s'elling 
a contaminated beverage, and is therefore entitled to 
the strong presumption of innocence and compliance 
with law, as demonstrated under Point 3 C, supra. Be-
fore that presumption of innocence any retroactive in-
ference or presumption which might otherwise be in-
dulged in under the authorities reli'ed on by plaintiff 
(and in which the presumption of innocence was not 
raised or discussed) must give way, and accordingly 
the Court below very properly refused to indulge an 
infer·ence or presumption of adulteration while in the 
possession and control of this defendant, where the only 
evidence was evidence of adulteration on March 31st, 
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I~ 
four and a half weeks or nwre after this defendant's 
poss'ession and control ceased. The inference of negli-
gence would have to be based upon another inference 
or presun1ption that an established fact on March 31st 
continued undisturbed through the preceding five weeks 
and that th'e contamination occurred while the bottle 
was in this defendant's possession and control. This 
cannot be done. 
The cases on the subject are myriad, and we cannot 
pretend that we have read them all. However, we have 
not found or read any case in which the retrospective 
inference or presumption which plaintiff reqU'ests has 
been indulged where the time lapse has been at least as 
long as four and a half weeks and might be a matter 
of months. In th'e cases discussed by plaintiff in his 
brief in which the inference or presumption was in-
dulged and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur accordingly 
applied, the bottle was opened immediately upon its pur-
chase by the consumer and whil'e still in the retailer's 
place of business. Under these circumstances and in 
view of the many opportunities for contamination shown 
during those four or five weeks or more the bottle was 
in plaintiff's possession it is r'easonable to assume, we 
submit, that even Mr. Justice Latimer would join in 
denying the application of res ipsa loquitur, especially 
in the light of the presumption of innocence and in the 
light of this Court's discussion of retrospective infer-
ences in the case of 
Jensen v. Logan City, supra. 
Plaintiff cites and quotes from sOine cases which 
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor under facts like 
those in the Jordan case. Some of them, such as the 
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exploding bottle cases, are not in point, as tampering 
with the bottle by opening and resealing it would d~­
crease rather than increase the pressure of the carbon 
dioxide gas in the beverage and henc·e decrease rather 
than increase the likelihood of an explosion. This is 
clear because the pressure of the gas is and must be 
the only source of power or force for a bottle explosion. 
Other cases which are in point are balanced by recent 
cases decided by courts quite as respectable and in 
which the doctrine of the Jordan case has been followed 
and the application of res ipsa loquitur refused. 
Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Byrne 
(Ky. 1953) 258 S.W. 2d 475. 
Sharpe v. Danville Coca Cola Bottling Company 
(Ill. Appeals) 132 N.E. 2d 442. 
An analygous Utah case is 
Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company (1955) 
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 Pac. 2d 1044. 
It should also be observed that at the pre-trial con-
ference defendant Bottling Company tendered evidence 
to which plaintiff tendered no rebuttal, and which it is 
submitted could not be rebutted in the light of the 
record, to the effect that the Company and its ·employees 
had used great care in the conduct of its bottling busi-
ness to prevent any foreign object whatsoever from 
getting into or remaining in any Coca Cola bottle or the 
beverage which it placed therein. Its machinery and 
procedures as was stated to the trial court are sub-
stantially those outlined in the Jordan case, supra, ex-
cept for the employnwnt of the automatic electric eye 
rej'ector. Its procedures have proved adequate in the 
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bottling of literally n1illions of bottles of Coca Cola in-
sofar as the prevention of contamination are concerned. 
In the simplification of the issues under Rule 16, 
U.R.C.P., it is respectfully submitted that it was quite 
proper for the trial court, upon consideration of this 
tender of evidence and no rebuttal being tendered, to 
conclude that reasonable minds could not differ on the 
question of due care by this defendant and that there 
was no bona fide issue on the question of negligence 
so that on this ground the trial court was justified in 
concluding that there was nothing to submit to the 
jury on the issue of this defendant's negligence. 
Even where indulged, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not shift the ultimate burden of proof, 
and the inference arising th·erefrom disappears when 
met by competent evidence. 
Olmstead v. Oregon Shortline R. Co. 
27 Utah 515, 76 Pac. 575. 
Such action is well within the power of the trial 
court under Rule 16. The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has held that at th'e· pre-trial conference the Court 
may compel parties to agree as to all facts concerning 
which there can be no real dispute. 
Berger v. Brannon (1949) 172 Fed. 2d 241. 
As this case was decided prior to Utah's adoption of 
the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, it is an established 
and legal precedent for this court. Certainly, in nar-
rowing the issues and preparing for trial the trial court 
must have power to withdraw issues as to which there 
is no real controversy. If parties are permitted to in-
sist on the trial of issues as to which they have no evi-
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dence, and where the ultimate burden of proof is upon 
them, then one of the primary purposes of Rule 16 is 
def·eated and aborted. 
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the trial court properly concluded that plain-
tiff has no claim against this defendant based on negli-
gence and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not 
applicable. 
Point 5. This defendant is not liable to plaintiff 
for violation of the statutes relating to adulterated 
foods; there is no proof tendered or available that the 
product was adulterated while in the hands of this de-
fendant. 
The arguments and authorities cited under Points 
3 and 4, we believe, effectively dispose of plaintiff's con-
tention that defendant Bottling Company is liable for 
violation of the Utah statutes prohibiting Inanufacture 
or sale of adulterated food products. 
First, this defendant has the benefit, especially as 
against this charge, of the strong presumptions of in-
nocence and legality in th:e conduct of its business, and 
actual violation of the statute by this defendant must be 
affirmatively proved as against these strong presump-
tions. 
Johnson v. Stoddard (:Mass. 1941), 37 N.E. 2d 505. 
Hopki~s v. Antorg Trading Corporation, 38 
N.Y.S. 2d 788. 
Tedder v. Coca Cola Bottling Cmnpany (S.C.) 
77 S.E. 2d 293. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not available 
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to aid plaintiff on this theory of absolute liability for 
violation of statute, as it is peculiar to the law of neg-
ligence. 
65 C.J.S., "Negligence," Section 220 (3), Page 
995, Note 13. 
Moreover, even if the doctrine were applicable ]n 
an action based on the statute imposing absolute lia-
bility, it cannot be indulged here because, as demon-
strated hereinbefore under the law of Utah as exem-
plifred in the Jensen v. Logan City case, supra, and the 
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company case, supra, 
there is no retrospective inference that the paper clip 
was in the bottle in question while the bottle was in 
the possession and control of this defendant approxi-
mately five weeks or more prior to its discovery by 
plaintiff. The time lag and the opportunities for tamper-
ing or substitution are too great, either in the Safeway 
Self-service Store where the bottle was set out and 
available to the public at large, at the plaintiff's birth-
day party, or in his fruit-room which was frequently left 
open. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion perhaps a word should be said about 
the general philosophy of liability. Plaintiff, in his 
brief, quotes extensively from Harper and James on 
The Law of Torts. The whole burden and philosophy 
of the writing of these eminent professors refle~ their 
own philosophical conviction that the burden.(injury 
should be distributed throughout society and shared by 
all, irrespective of fault on the part of those asked to 
contribute. It would seen1 that the devotion of a life-
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time to teaching instead of to participation in the actual 
workings of a modern civilization has led these authors 
into an ultra-liberal philosophy that "everybody should 
share and share alike, and the burden of injuries as 
well as the benefits of wealth should be distributed by 
the courts without regard to the deserts of the claimant 
or the fault of the claimee." This is i1nplicit in their 
entire discussion of "fault as a basis of liability." 
2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 12.1 
and following. 
Accordingly, in their selection of cases and in their 
emphasis these learned professors have actively sought 
to impose their philosophy on their readers, and through 
their readers on society. This is, of course, their priv-
ilege under the Constitution, but certainly in evaluating 
their writings the Court should consider the circum-
stances, and should consider that in taking this extrem-
ely lib'eral view the professors have not in fact ad-
vanced the cause of justice, but have retreated to the 
most primitive type of justice, as exemplified in very 
·early "Case of the Thorns", Y.B. 6 d. IV 7, pl. 18 (1466): 
"For though a man do'eth a lawful thing, yet if any dam-
age do thereby befall another, ye shall answer for it . 
. . . If a man shoot at butts and hurt another unawares, 
an action lies ... if a man assault me, and I lift up my 
staff to defend myself and in lifting it up hit another, 
an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful 
thing. And the reason of all these cases is, because he 
that is damaged ought to be recompensed ... " 
This is the philosophy of Professors Harper and 
James. It is not the law of Utah nor, it is submitted 
(except in statutory cases like Workmen's Compensa-
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tion) does it s'eenl to be the law anywhere except in those 
limited jurisdictions and fields where the "share the 
wealth philosophers" have succeeded in imposing their 
theories of "communism of liability." 
In an imperfect world the law of averages dictates 
that some damage and hurt is occasionally inevitable, 
and we must all take our chances. Under any theory 
of western justice one should not be required to share 
his wealth with another, just because the other has been 
unfortunate and suffered an injury. This sharing may 
be Christian Charity, but it is not law, and it is not 
justice. 
As the Rhode Island court indicated, if the plaintiff 
here and Messrs. Harper and James desire to change 
our concept of justice and our law, th'ey should address 
themselves to the legislatures and not to the courts who 
are sworn to uphold the law as written. 
It is respectfully submitted that as a matter of 
law and justice, the plaintiff has no claim against this 
defendant and th'e judgment below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul Thatcher, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Coca Cola Bottling Company 
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